

# Vehicle taxation and subsidies without nation-scale surveillance

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# Estonian EV Subsidy

## 2. peatükk Toetuse andmise alused

### § 4. Toetatav tegevus

- (1) Meetme raames toetatakse elektrisõiduki ostmist kasutamiseks peamiselt Eestis.
- (2) Elektrisõiduk käesoleva määruse mõistes on ainult elektri jõul liikuv ehk täiselektriline M1 või N1 kategooria sõiduk.
- (3) Elektrisõidukiga tuleb nelja aasta jooksul toetuse väljamaksmisest läbida vähemalt 80 000 kilomeetrit.
- (4) Elektrisõidukiga tuleb vähemalt 80% lõikes 3 nõutud kilometraazist läbida Eestis.
- (5) Elektrisõiduki esimese 80 000 kilomeetri läbimiseks kulutatud energiakulu ulatuses tuleb tarbida taastuvenergiat.

# Compliance

- Cars were installed with GPS trackers
- Only odometer readings and current country were transmitted once per quarter
- GPS module could be toggled remotely
- Opt-out with periodic reporting and allowing inspection.

# ZK-SecreC

- DSL for creating Zero-Knowledge proofs
- Emphasis on real data sizes and interoperability
- Designed to tackle new classes of problems
- Outputs intermedia representation that protocols can ingest



## ZK-SecreC

Zero-Knowledge (ZK) Proofs are a cryptographic technology used to convince Relying Parties that a statement holds, while not revealing them the evidence that makes that statement hold. While ZK Proofs are already widely used in certain real-world applications, and even more ubiquitously as subroutines in cryptographic functionalities, we believe that a well-design programming language will simplify their even more general uptake. Hence we have introduced the domain-specific language ZK-SecreC.

The power of ZK-SecreC ultimately derives from its type system, which is described and justified in the following research paper:

```
@inproceedings{zk-secrec-language,  
  author      = {Dan Bogdanov and  
                Joosep J{\~{a}}ger and  
                Peeter Laud and  
                H{\~{a}}rmeel Nestra and  
                Martin Petit and  
                Jaak Randmeets and  
                Raul-Martin Rebane and  
                Ville Sokk and
```


# Language Features

```
uint [N] $pre @prover
```

- Three-dimensional type system
  - Stage: mark on/off-circuit
  - Domain: mark data visibility
- Allows branching on Stage and Domain
- Library of highly polymorphic code

## Witness expansion

- Reducing the size of the circuit is crucial for performance
- Instead of  $f$ , maybe compute  $f^{-1}$
- Care must be taken to not underconstrain
- $10 \cdot 10 \bmod 13 = 9$
- Creates need to track on/off circuit computation



## ZK-SecreC example


```
pub fn sqrt_fixed [N : Nat, $S, @D](x : Fixed [N, $S, @D]) -> Fixed [N, $S, @D]
  if (post $S) {
    let res = fixed_post (sqrt_fixed_pre (fixed_pre (x)));
    if (@prover <= @D) { check_coef_sqrt (x, res) }
    res
  } else {sqrt_fixed_pre (x)}
}
```

# Output

- Outputs IR that integrates with ZK protocols
  - VOLE (Diet Mac'n'Cheese, emp-zk)
  - MPC-in-the-head (ZKB++)
  - VOLE-in-the-head (Schmivitz)
  - Circom
- Function Gates
- Field Switching

## Proof statement

- Approximated Estonia with Circles
- Used standard (x,y) coordinate projection for Estonia
- Given a coordinate trace
  - Check validity of inputs
  - Find total path length
  - Find total path length within Estonia
  - Assert that they're within parameters




# Requirements

- Needed to ensure privacy of
  - Location trails
  - Activity patterns
- 1h/day of driving
- 2 coordinates per minute
- 3600 coordinates/month
- 43200 coordinates/year



# Input validation

- Assume coordinates are signed by a trusted source
- Signature check not under ZK
- Poseidon over SHA256 was necessary
- Poseidon implemented in ZK-SecreC




# Distance Evaluation


- For each coordinate
  - Compute if it's contained in a circle
  - Compute distance to previous coordinate
- Added support for fractional numbers
- Heavy use of witness expansion tricks for performance
- Verifier challenges for faster inequality checks


## Highway tax

- Prove that a vehicle drove no more than  $d$  km along a certain highway
- Represent highway as line segments
- Create polygon for highway + margin
- Create Delaunay triangulation of surrounding area
- Show that  $L - d$  km was in triangles,  $L :=$  total distance




# Demonstrator





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


Prove that the path satisfies validation criteria.

Prove

# Performance

Prover	Tracking duration	Runtime
Pixel 5a	Trip (400)	13.60s
Pixel 5a	Month (3600)	127s
Pixel 5a	Year (43800)	1724s
Pi 5	Month (3600)	23s
Pi 5	Year (43800)	152s
Pixel 5a	Trip (HW, 400)	36s



Thank you!

